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Evidence Code § 1107 (amended); Penal Code § 1473.5 (amended).
SB 1385 (Romero); 2004 Stat. ch. 609.
I. INTRODUCTION
[The] articulate narratives [of battered women convicted for killing their
abusers] convey fear, fatigue, frustration, and resignation. Their
collective voice describes a series of events and interactions that
produces in each woman a firm belief that the unavoidable conclusion to
the violent relationship is death-hers, his, or both, and perhaps other
family members as well.'
In California, several hundred women are serving time for killing the men
who abused them.2 Research reveals that the majority of these women killed their
partners in self-defense.' Despite the implementation of recent laws allowing for
women to introduce evidence of the effects of intimate partner battering and its
impact on the commission of their crimes 4 often little evidence of the abuse or
how the abuse contributed to their crimes is presented at trial.5
1. ELIZABETH DERMODY LEONARD, CONVICTED SURVIVORS: THE IMPRISONMENT OF BATTERED
WOMEN WHO KILL 115 (2002).
2. FREE BATTERED WOMEN, FACT SHEETS, at http://www.freebatteredwomen.org/resources/
factsheets.htmI (last visited July 7, 2004) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
3. See Mary E. Gilfus, Women's Experiences of Abuse as a Risk Factor for Incarceration, VAWNET
APPLIED RESEARCH FORUM 5 (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.vawnet.org/DomesticViolence/Research/
VAWnetDocs/ARincarcemtion.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that abused women may
also be incarcerated for attempting to protect their children from the batterer); see also US. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, VIOLENCE BY INTIMATES: ANALYSIS OF DATA ON CRIMES BY CURRENT OR FORMER SPOUSES,
BOYFRIENDS, AND GIRLFRIENDS 4-5 (1998), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/vi.pdf (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (indicating that women are "5 to 8 times more likely than males to be
victimized by an intimate" and that "female murder victims are substantially more likely than male murder
victims to have been killed by an intimate").
4. CAL. EvlD. CODE § 1107 (West 1995 & Supp. 2004).
5. See LEONARD, supra note 1, at 113-14 (explaining that there are several reasons why the impact of
domestic violence on the commission of the offense may not be introduced at trial including: lack of financial
resources barring expert testimony, neglect of defense attorneys in eliciting evidence of the abuse and
accurately depicting the context in which the killing occurred, acceptance of plea bargains in order to spare
families the humiliation of trial, and the minimization of the abuse or shame regarding the violence inhibiting
abused women from speaking out about their experiences); see also id. at 101 (highlighting that several women
were so highly medicated by jail officials that they were unable to effectively assist in their defense).
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In 1996, the California Supreme Court definitively stated that women have a
right to introduce evidence of battered women syndrome and that such evidence
is relevant to all of the elements of a self-defense claim.6 Current law only
permits women convicted prior to 1992 to bring a writ of habeas corpus to
address the fact that they were not allowed to introduce evidence of battered
women syndrome.7 Therefore, a large class of women have no legal remedy for
the fact that they were convicted without being permitted to bring forth such
evidence.8 Additionally, limited time, resources, and attorneys willing to work
with incarcerated women9 have barred several eligible women from bringing
their writs and there is a concern that they will not have time to do so prior to the
sunset date of January 1, 2010. Finally, while the law provides that women may
introduce evidence of battering and its effects in any situation where it
contributed to the commission of the crime,10 only women convicted of killing
their abusive partners have writ authority."
In 2002, the Habeas Project was formed by Free Battered Women, California
Women's Law Center and the USC Post-Conviction Justice Project. 2 The
Habeas Project worked to free battered women who would meet the criteria to
file a writ of habeas corpus under California Penal Code section 1473.5.1' Free
Battered Women sponsored Chapter 609 to respond to concerns that inequities
and inconsistencies in section 1473.5 had left the intended beneficiaries of the




California law provides that killing in self-defense is justified when a person
is "resisting any attempt to murder any person, or to commit a felony, or to do
some great bodily injury upon any person... ."' The three main components
6. People v. Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th 1073, 1084-89, 921 P.2d 1,7-10 (1996).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473.5 (West Supp. 2004).
8. SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1385, at 8 (Mar. 30, 2004).
9. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMIrIEE ANALYSIS OF SB 784, at 2-3 (Feb. 21,
2003) (justifying an extension of the previous sunset date from January 1, 2005 to January 1, 2010 by
explaining that the amount of time needed to track down witnesses, police reports, and medical records was
more time consuming than anticipated, and that finding pro bono legal assistance was difficult).
10. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West 1995 & Supp. 2004).
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473.5 (West Supp. 2004).
12. THE CALIFORNIA HABEAS PROJECT, HISTORY, at http://www.habeasproject.org/history.htm (last
visited July 6, 2004) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
13. Id.
14. THE CALIFORNIA HABEAS PROJECT, HELPING INCARCERATED SURVIVORS THROUGH LEGISLATION,
at http://www.freebatteredwomen.org/habeasproject.htm. (last visited July 6, 2004) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 197(1) (West 1999).
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required to satisfy the legal standard for self-defense are reasonable belief,
necessity, and proportionality. 6 The reasonable belief component is composed of
a subjective and an objective element. 7 The subjective element requires a finding
that the defendant had an honest or actual belief that his or her use of deadly
force was necessary to prevent an unlawful attack or threat by the Victim.' 8 The
objective element sets forth that the person must have objectively reasonable
grounds for believing that such force is necessary to repel an imminent attack.' 9
The necessity element requires that the victim's actions must present what the
victim believes to be an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.0
Finally, the proportionality requirement provides that a person cannot
successfully propose a self-defense claim if he or she used excessive force in
relation to the harm threatened.2'
A claim of self-defense is considered to be "perfect" when all elements are
satisfied and will result in an acquittal.22 An "imperfect self-defense" claim
results when the defendant is seen to have a subjectively honest but objectively
unreasonable belief in the fear of imminent bodily harm or death and mitigates a
charge of murder to involuntary homicide.23
16. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 221 (3d ed. 2001) (stating that self-
defense, as in other justification defenses, requires necessity and proportionality components along with a
reasonable belief element).
17. See People v. Flannel, 25 Cal. 3d 668, 674-75, 160 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1979) (explaining that self-defense
requires that the defendant actually and reasonably believed in the need to defend).
18. People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 1186, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 172 (1989).
19. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 198 (West 1999) (stating "[tihe circumstances must be sufficient to excite
the fears of a reasonable person").
20. E.g., Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 1189, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 174 (stating that California case and statutory
law require that the defendant "perceives in the victim's behavior at the moment of the killing an indication that
the victim is about to attempt, or is attempting, to fulfill the threat"); see also People v. Scoggins, 37 Cal. 676,
684 (1869) (setting forth the longstanding requirement of immediacy in meeting the imminence requirement in
California)
A previous threat alone, and unaccompanied by any immediate demonstration of force at the
time of the encounter will not justify or excuse an assault, because it may be that the party
making the threat has relented or abandoned his purpose, or his courage may have failed, or the
threat may have been only idle gasconade, made without any purpose to execute it.
Id.
21. DRESSLER, supra note 16, at 222.
22. Lisa S. Scheff, People v. Humphrey: Justice for Battered Women or a License to Kill? 32 U.S.F. L.
REV. 225, 234 (1997).
23. See In re Christian S., 7 Cal. 4th 768, 783, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33 (1994) (declaring that in imperfect
self-defense, "the defendant is deemed to have acted without malice and cannot be convicted of murder but can
be convicted of manslaughter"); see also Cal. JIC 5.17 (West 2004) (instructing the jury that "[a] person who
kills another person in the actual but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend against imminent peril to life
or great bodily injury, kills unlawfully but does not harbor malice aforethought and is not guilty of murder").
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B. Battered Women's Syndrome
In 1979, Dr. Lenore Walker proposed that battered women's behaviors could
be described by what she defined as "Battered Woman Syndrome" (BWS)1
4
BWS "is the name given to the measurable psychological changes that occur
after exposure to repeated abuse., 25 Dr. Walker defined the syndrome as a sub-
category of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).26 Dr. Walker noted that
battered women, like those suffering from PTSD, often suffer from cognitive
disturbances, 2  high arousal symptoms,
2" and high avoidance symptoms.29
Additionally, abused women often develop "learned helplessness" or the belief
that there is nothing they can do to escape or alleviate the abuse.30
Dr. Walker described three phases typical to battering relationships: a
tension-building phase, the acute battering of the victim, and the reconciliation
phase. During the reconciliation phase, the batterer often apologizes, promises to
never be violent again, and offers gifts.3 The third stage reinforces and maintains
the relationship by giving the victim hope the violence will end. 2
BWS explains why women remain in abusive relationships.33 Threats from
the partner (e.g. kidnapping, physical injury or death) often thwart attempts by
24. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN xiv-xv (1979) (defining a battered woman as "a
woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to
coerce her to do something he wants her to do without any concern for her right" if that man is an intimate
partner and the woman stays beyond the first incident of abuse).
25. See Lenore E. Walker, Battered Women Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 321, 326 (1992) (also stating, "[tihe use of trauma theory together with the psychological
understanding of feminist psychology, oppression, powerlessness and intermittent reinforcement theories such
as learned helplessness, all help us to understand the psychological impact of physical, social, and serious
psychological abuse on the battered woman").
26. Id. at 327-28.
27. See id. (describing that cognitive disturbances consist of repetitive intrusive memories such as
flashbacks of previous abusive incidents; the loss of memory such as denial, minimization and repression of
battering incidents; and cognitive confusion, attention deficits and lack of concentration).
28. See id. at 328 (indicating that battered women become hyper vigilant to signs of danger and have
little insight into the consequences of their actions).
29. See id. (providing that avoidance characteristics including depression, denial, minimization, and
repression are often used to avoid dealing with the dangerousness of the situation and often cause battered
women to become isolated).
30. See People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 1195, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 178 (1990) (noting that
because of the randomness of the abuse battered women often perceive that they are incapable of doing
anything to escape and that previous unsuccessful attempts to defend themselves from the abuse add to the
sense of helplessness).
31. See Walker, supra note 25, at 330 (indicating that even during the reconciliation phase the victim
never feels completely safe).
32. Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence: V. Battered Women Who Kill
Their Abusers. 106 HARV. L. REv. 1574, 1578 (1993) [hereinafter Legal Responses to Domestic Violence]
violence will end).
33. See CYNTHIA GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE 160 (1989) (noting that some of the common
misconceptions about abused women are that they are masochists, that they deserve the abuse they have
received, that they provoked their beatings, and that they could have left the relationship).
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the woman to exit the battering relationship.34 Furthermore, structural constraints
such as economic and social isolation may pose significant barriers preventing
escape from the relationship.35 Separation is often the most dangerous time for a
woman.16 Even when women successfully leave an abusive relationship, the
violence often does not end.37 Furthermore, many women do not believe police
intervention will offer effective assistance because law enforcement has been
unsupportive or they believe that the battering will increase if they contact the
police.38 Finally, the development of learned helplessness often causes abused
women to believe they cannot escape their partners.39
C. BWS and Self-Defense
Previously, women who killed their abusive partners did not have a defense
and were encouraged to plead guilty to murder.40 Some women utilized the
defense of temporary insanity.'
34. See Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 1195, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 178 (stating that batterers will sometimes
threaten to kill the woman or kidnap the children if she attempts to leave the relationship).
35. See Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of
Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1191, 1233 (1993) (emphasizing that economic dependence
can make it impossible for a woman to leave her partner because she cannot obtain housing, medical care, food,
or clothing for her children and noting that women and their children sometimes become homeless when they
leave).
36. See Walker, supra note 25, at 328 (stressing that the number of abused women killed by their
partners when trying to separate has increased).
37. See Dutton, supra note 35, at 1232 (suggesting that women's fear of retaliation for leaving their
partners is not unjustified because most women who are killed by their abusive partners are killed after
separating from them).
38. See MURRAY A. STRAUSS & RICHARD J. GELLES, PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN FAMILIES:
RISK FACTORS AND ADAPTATIONS TO VIOLENCE IN 8,145 FAMILIES 482-87 (1990) (explaining that abused
women often do not call the police out of a perception that the battering was not "criminal" and that the police
often uphold such stereotypes perhaps in response to a lack of judicial and prosecutorial action against
batterers); see also Arlene Weisz, Spouse Assault Replication Program: Studies of Effects of Arrest on Domestic
Violence, VAWNET APPLIED RESEARCH FORUM 2 (Nov. 2001), available at http://www.vawnet.org/Domestic
Violence/Research/VAWnetDocs/ARarrest.php (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (examining studies
that revealed that arrested abusers spent little or no time in jail and that few arrested men were prosecuted or
found guilty).
39. See People v. Day, 2 Cal. App. 4th 405, 418, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 921 (1992) (quoting domestic
violence expert, Pat Cervelli's testimony that abused women perceive their batterers to be more powerful than
he is in reality which, along with previous experiences of unsupportive law enforcement officials and fear of
retaliation by the batterer, lead to a sense of futility in trying to escape the relationship).
40. See Legal Responses to Domestic Violence supra note 32, at 1577 (explaining that self-defense
claims often appeared out of reach because women were perceived to have used deadly force in reaction to an
attack that did not appear relatively dangerous); see also Walker, supra note 25, at 321 (explaining that self-
defense claims were unavailable to abused women who killed their partners, often because several women will
kill their partner following an abusive interaction or at a time when it may not appear there is an immediate
threat of imminent serious bodily danger or death to the woman). But see, ANN JONES, NEXT TIME, SHE'LL BE
DEAD: BATTERING & HOW TO STOP IT 102 (1994) (citing Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense,
396-97) (arguing that women are more likely to kill their partner during a confrontation and that claims that
abused women are more likely to kill their partner during non-abusive situations is not supported by statistical
data); FREE BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 2 (citing statistics indicating that seventy-five percent of the
2005 / Evidence
After developing her theories on BWS, Dr. Walker began providing expert
testimony to explain battered women's behaviors to jurors. '2 The admissibility of
such testimony gained acceptance in several states in the late 1970s and early
1980S43 and helped battered women to meet the legal standard of self-defense.
44
Expert testimony on battered women's experiences is useful in helping
abused women to meet the legal standards of self-defense. Often, expert
testimony helps female defendants meet the self-defense necessity or imminence
requirements.46 Additionally, testimony facilitates the defense by providing
evidence that the defendant had the actual and subjective belief she was in
danger.47 Finally, expert testimony may help establish the reasonableness of the
woman's belief that she was in imminent danger and that it was necessary for her
to use deadly force.48 The expert's testimony also is essential in deconstructing
basic stereotypes surrounding abused women49 and may be used to rehabilitate a
witness. °
appellate opinions involving cases where abused women killed their batterers, the killing occurred during a
confrontation).
41. Walker, supra note 25, at 322.
42. Scheff, supra note 22, at 225.
43. Walker, supra note 25, at 322.
44. Id.
45. See GILLESPIE, supra note 33, at 159 (explaining that an expert is essential to provide evidence that
the woman's belief that she was in imminent danger and needed to use deadly force was reasonable).
46. See People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 1194-95, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 177-78 (1990) Abused
women have a greater sensitivity to danger and therefore, when threatened with more abuse, will react to the
danger more quickly and accurately perceive when an abusive episode is not over. Consequently, when an
abused woman kills her partner while he is sleeping she recognizes that the abuse would otherwise continue
when he awakes. Id.
47. See id. at 1198 (asserting that the expert testimony provides an explanation of how the defendant's
experiences of abuse affected her perceptions of danger and the actions she could believe she need to take to
protect herself).
48. See People v. Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th 1073, 1088, 921 P.2d 1, 7 (1995) (noting that in determining
reasonableness the jury must consider all of the relevant circumstances and that BWS evidence is relevant to
explain behavior that otherwise may appear unreasonable and to describe how given her experiences, the abused
woman's actions are understandable).
49. See GILLESPIE, supra note 33, at 159 (explaining that battered woman syndrome testimony can help
by revealing how widespread domestic violence is and elucidating why some of the defendant's puzzling
behaviors are present such as why she did not leave or seek assistance, therefore helping "the jurors to put
themselves in the woman's shoes and see the situation the way she saw it").
50. See People v. Day, 2 Cal. App. 4th 405, 416-18, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 922-24 (1992) (emphasizing
that BWS evidence can assist the jury in objectively analyzing the defendant's testimony by providing that a
woman who strikes back is not engaged in "mutual combat," dispelling the myth that the defendant would have
left if she was actually experiencing the abuse she described, and illuminating the defendant's seemingly
"guilty" behaviors following the death of her partner such as fleeing the scene out of intense fear and belief in
the omniscient power of her partner); see also ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE
ANALYSIS OF SB 1944, at 4 (June 20, 2000) (relating that BWS evidence can rehabilitate the credibility of the
witness by explaining inconsistencies between the defendant's testimony and prior inconsistent statements to
authorities).
910
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A majority of jurisdictions admit BWS evidence; however, the extent to
which the evidence is admissible depends upon the jurisdiction's use and scope
of expert testimony on the issue of self-defense.5'
D. California and the Admissibility of BWS Evidence
California has gradually accepted battered women's testimony to support
self-defense claims. 2 California first permitted testimony regarding battered
women's syndrome as relevant to determining whether the defendant established
the honest belief requirement for imperfect self-defense in 1989."3 However,
California specifically rejected the use of expert testimony to demonstrate the
objective reasonableness of the defendant's use of deadly force,- barring the
availability of a perfect self-defense claim. In 1992, decisional law permitting
battered women's syndrome testimony when relevant was codified in California
Evidence Code section 1107. . However, confusion about how and when to use
expert testimony on battered women's syndrome and in which legal contexts led
to inconsistencies in the application of the statute.56 In 2002, the statue was
amended to expand the use of battered women's syndrome testimony to
expressly include expert testimony that describes the types of experiences victims
face and the impact of those experiences.57
In 1996, the California Supreme Court expanded the use of battered women's
syndrome testimony by permitting its introduction to determine reasonableness
of perceiving imminent danger, as well as the defendant's subjective belief in the
need for self-defense.5 s Thus, battered women could use expert testimony to
prove perfect self-defense claims. "
In 1992, the legislature also amended California Penal Code section 4801
and expressly authorized the Board of Prison Terms to consider evidence of
51. Erin M. Masson, Annotation, Admissibility of Expert or Opinion Evidence of Battered-Woman
Syndrome on Issue of Self-Defense, 58 A.L.R. 749, 765 (2004).
52. Scheff, supra note 22, at 237-39.
53. E.g., People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 1198, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 181 (1990) (holding that
battered women testimony could only be utilized to determine the honest belief requirement for self-defense but
not to prove the reasonableness requirement for self-defense because that would permit an expert to predict the
defendant's state of mind in violation of California law forbidding expert testimony on whether a defendant did
or did not have the requisite mental state required to commit the charged crime).
54. Id.
55. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1107 (West 1995 & Supp. 2004).
56. Scheff, supra note 22, at 227.
57. SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1944, at 4 (May 9,2000).
58. See People v. Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th 1073, 1081-82, 921 P.2d 1, 7 (1995) (noting that the
Legislature, in Evidence Code section 1107, has determined that expert testimony regarding battered women's
syndrome, when relevant, is admissible).
59. See People v. Day, 2 Cal. App. 4th 405, 419, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 924 (1989) (Battered woman's
syndrome expert testimony is relevant "to explain a behavior pattern that might otherwise appear unreasonable
to the average person. Evidence of battered woman's syndrome not only explains how a battered woman might
think, react, or behave, it places the behavior in an understandable light.").
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battered women's syndrome in reviewing prisoners' requests for pardons or
sentence commutations, 6° resolving inconsistencies between the Board's review
procedures and California Evidence Code section 1107. In 1995, the statute was
expanded to include prisoners' experiences of domestic violence 6' in order to
ensure that the Board's review was not limited by the narrow definition of
battered women syndrome.62 That legislation also provided that the evidence of
battered women's experiences could be considered in any case "where it appears
the criminal behavior was the result of that victimization. 63
In 2001, the legislature added section 1473.5 to the California Penal Code to
permit women convicted of killing their abusers prior to 1992 to bring a writ of
habeas corpus if expert testimony regarding the effects of battering would have
been probative to the issue of the woman's culpability. 64 The initial version of the
statute provided that it would only be available until January 1, 2005 65 The
sunset date was extended in 2003 to January 1, 2010 in response to concerns that
the process for filing was taking longer than originally anticipated due to
difficulty in obtaining necessary records and the lack of funding for inmates to
obtain legal counsel to file their writs.6
60. 1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 1138 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801).
61. See 1995 Cal. Stat. ch. 905, § I (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801) (providing that "'evidence of
battered woman syndrome' may include evidence of the effects of physical, emotional, or mental abuse upon
the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of victims of domestic violence").
62. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 231, at 1 (June
20, 1995) ("The purpose of this bill is to specify the authority of the Board of Prison Terms to consider a
broader range of inmates' experiences as victims of domestic violence in commutation and pardon decisions.");
see also Mary Ann Dutton, Critique of the "Battered Woman Syndrome" Model, VAWNET APPLIED RESEARCH
FORUM 2 (Jan. 1997), available at http://www.vawnet.org/DomesticViolence/Research/VAWnetDocs/
ARbws.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining that "'battered woman syndrome' has
become a stereotype that often does not fit the current state of knowledge concerning battering and its effects").
63. 1995 Cal. Stat. ch. 905, § 1 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801).
64. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473.5a (West Supp. 2004).
A writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted on the basis that evidence relating to battered women's
syndrome... based on abuse committed on the perpetrator of a homicide by the victim of that
homicide, was not introduced at the trial relating to the prisoner's incarceration, and... had it been
introduced there is a reasonable probability.., that the result of the proceedings would have been
different.
Id.; see also SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 799, at 3 (Sept. 10, 2001) (explaining
that women convicted prior to 1992 were not allowed to present a full defense and that consequently those
women were serving substantially longer sentences then people convicted of identical offenses after 1992).
65. 2001 Cal. Stat. Ch. 858, § 1 (repealing and adding CAL. PENAL CODE § 1475.3).
66. SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 784, at 2-3 (Feb. 21, 2003)
(explaining that the amount of time needed to track down witnesses, police reports and medical records was
more time consuming than anticipated and that finding pro bono legal assistance was difficult); Stefanie Frith,
'Battered Women' Deadline Approaches; Prison; Inmates Convicted of Murder Are Running out of time to
Claim they were Victims of Abuse, THE PRESS ENTERPRISE, June 13, 2003 (declaring that four hundred out of
nine hundred women convicted of murder in California were convicted before 1992 and many would not have
time to file their habeas corpus petitions before the 2005 deadline).
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III. CHAPTER 609
Chapter 609 changes the existing title of California Evidence Code section
1107 from the "Expert Testimony on Battered Women's Experiences" to "Expert
Witness Testimony on Intimate Partner Battering and Its Effects. 67  The
amendment replaces all references to "Battered Women's Syndrome" with
"intimate partner battering and its effects."6  Chapter 609 specifies that the
changes are not to impact existing decisional law regarding the evidence code.69
Chapter 609 expands the class of offenders who may file a writ of habeas
corpus for failure to consider evidence regarding intimate partner battering and
its effects. The amendment extends the availability of a unit from persons
convicted of a homicide to all persons convicted of a violent felony as defined by
California Penal Code section 667.5.70 Additionally, Chapter 609 extends the
time frame for habeas corpus relief by allowing all persons convicted prior to
August 26, 1996, as opposed to January 1, 1992, to be permitted to file a writ of
habeas corpus when expert testimony would have been relevant to the
defendant's culpability.7' Finally, Chapter 609 also expands the authority to file a
writ of habeas corpus for the absence of expert testimony from the trial only to
any trial proceeding relating to the woman's incarceration.72
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Chapter 609 responds to concerns by advocates of abused women regarding
the use of the term "Battered Women Syndrome, 73 by replacing all references to
BWS with "intimate partner battering and its effects. 74 The semantic change
should eliminate the impression that the woman is mentally ill.75 The change
67. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107(e) (amended by Chapter 609).
68. Id. § 1107(a)-(e).
69. Id. § 1107(f).
70. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473.5(b) (amended by Chapter 609).
71. Id.
72. Id. § 1473.5(a).
73. See e.g., People v. Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th 1073, 1083, 921 P.2d 1, 7 (1995).
Domestic violence experts have critiqued the phrase 'battered woman's syndrome' because (1)
it implies that there is one syndrome which all battered women develop, (2) it has pathological
connotations which suggest that battered women suffer from some sort of sickness, (3) expert
testimony on domestic violence refers to more than woman's psychological reactions to
violence, (4) it focuses attention on the battered woman rather than on the batterer's coercive
and controlling behavior and (5) it creates an image of battered women as suffering victims
rather than as active survivors.
Id.
74. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (a)-(e) (amended by Chapter 609).
75. See Dutton, supra note 35, at 1195-96 (explaining that the term "Battered Woman Syndrome" does
not accurately reflect the wide diversity of experiences battered women face or the range of legal contexts in
which "Battered Women Syndrome" evidence is introduced, has presented confusion in the legal literature, and
often causes an inaccurate impression that the woman in question is mentally ill).
913
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illustrates that BWS is itself a defense rather than an explanation of how an
abused woman's actions meet the legal standards of self-defense. 6 Additionally,
the use of the term BWS has led to the impression that battered women have a
monolithic profile, and the change in terminology should reflect the reality of the
diversity of experiences faced by battered women."
In addition to affecting the use of evidence of the experiences of battered
women, the change in terminology should provide consistency in the law. Given
that the title of Evidence Code section 1107(e) is "Expert Witness Testimony on
Battered Women's Experience" this amendment provides uniformity and
alleviates confusion by deleting the retained BWS terminology in Evidence Code
section 1007 and Penal Code section 1475.3.78 However, while Chapter 609
provides that the amendments to Evidence Code Section 1107 are not intended to
affect any decisional law it leaves questions as to how other sections referencing
battered women's syndrome are to be interpreted.
79
Chapter 609 takes steps to remedy the fact that many of the intended
beneficiaries of the laws allowing for expert testimony have not had access to
habeas relief. It allows for women convicted between 1992 and 1996 to have writ
authority if the admission of the expert testimony on battering would be
probative on the issue of culpability. ° Chapter 609 also provides for uniformity
in the law by extending writ authority from persons convicted of a homicide to
all persons convicted of a violent felony as defined by California Penal Code
section 667.5." However, the amendments fall short of providing complete
consistency within the law by failing to authorize a writ for prisoners convicted
76. See Scheff, supra note 22, at 249 (noting that the term "syndrome" suggests that it is a defense itself
rather than an explanation of how an abused women's actions meet the legal standards of self-defense).
77. Dutton, supra note 34, at 1195-96.
78. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1385, at 3 (Apr. 13,
2004).
79. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB1385, at 6 (Mar. 30,
2004) (explaining that California Penal Code section 4801 is not affected by the bill).
80. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1385, at 7-8 (Mar. 30,
2004) (stressing that current law, by only permitting writs to be filed for those convicted prior to January 1,
1992, eliminates a large class of women who were denied the introduction of BWS evidence because after 1992
the statute permitting the introduction was inconsistently applied and it was not until 1996 that the California
Supreme Court definitively stated that women had a constitutional right to introduce BWS evidence); Jill E.
Adams, Unlocking Liberty: Is California's Habeas Law the Key to Freeing Unjustly Imprisoned Battered
Women? 19 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 217, 231 (2004).
80. CAL. PENAL CODE § I (West 2004).
81. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1385, at 4 (June 8,
2004) (noting that the law permits expert testimony on the effects of battering in all types of crimes and
explaining that the amendment will provide consistency in the law by allowing writs of habeas corpus to be
filed by women convicted of violent felonies as well as homicide). But see THE CALIFORNIA HABEAS PROJECT,
supra note 14 (indicating that the initial version of the bill would permit a writ of habeas corpus for all types of
crimes in which domestic violence impacted the defendant but, in response to opposition from the Attorney
General and the California District Attorney, the bill was limited to allow a writ of habeas corpus only for
violent felonies).
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of any crime in which domestic violence was a contributing factor.82 In order to
promote justice, the law should provide a remedy for all incarcerated women
where domestic violence was a contributing factor in their culpability. 3
There are limitations to Chapter 609. Given the limited resources of
incarcerated women, along with high costs and time required to file a writ of
habeas corpus, it is likely that not all of the unfairly incarcerated women will be
able to file their writs prior to the sunset date of January 1, 2010." Furthermore,
Chapter 609 can only be effective if incarcerated women know their right to the
possibility of habeas relief and prison officials have not been cooperative. 5
Additionally, even when identified, there are not enough domestic violence
experts to meet the needs of the number of incarcerated battered women.86 There
is also a need for additional training on how to effectively use and admit expert
testimony regarding battering and its effects.8 7 Finally, the provisions of
California Evidence Code section 1107 can only be effective if, once women are
arrested, they are allowed to participate fully in their defense.88
82. See also SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, SENATE BILL ANALYSIS OF SB1385, at 6 (Mar.
30, 2004) (noting that an earlier provision of the bill which authorized a writ for prisoners convicted of all
crimes would provide uniformity in the law because expert testimony is permitted in all criminal cases where
relevant). Compare CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (amended by Chapter 609) (providing that evidence of battering
and its effects can be introduced in any crime where domestic violence was a contributing factor) with CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1473.5 (amended by Chapter 609) (authorizing writ authority when there was an absence of
evidence of battering only when a homicide or violent felony was committed).
83. See Christina M. Vogt, Women in the Criminal Justice System: An Ex-Lifer's Account Part One.
Interview of Gloria Killian, 3 ExPOsITORY MAGAZINE, Issue 1, 2004, available at http://www.expository
magazine.net/women in.cj.system.php (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) ("One of the worst inequities
that you see in women's convictions is in the cases where they were actually just an accessory or even had a
lesser part in the crime."); see also FREE BA'ITERED WOMEN, supra note 2 (reporting that hundreds, and
possibly thousands, of women are serving time for crimes where domestic violence was a contributing factor).
84. See supra Part III (explaining that earlier bills raised concerns that the prior provision would not
provide enough time for all eligible women to bring their writs). But see SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC
SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB1385, at 5 (Apr. 13, 2004) (citing the California District Attorneys
Association's opposition, which stated that eliminating the sunset date would "open the floodgates to habeas
corpus petitions not previously cognizable" and "undermine the longstanding policy favoring finality of
judgment under the law").
85. See Jill E. Adams, Unlocking Liberty: Is California's Habeas Law the Key to Freeing Unjustly
Imprisoned Battered Women? 19 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 217, 231 (2004) (citing Interview with Johanna
Hoffman, Co-Coordinator, Free Battered Women, in San Francisco, Cal. (Nov. 19, 2003)) (explaining that
prison officials have not permitted legal teams to present information to large groups of prisoners and have
denied access to prisoners).
86. Id. at 232.
87. Telephone Interview with Johanna Hoffman, Coordinator, Free Battered Women (July 30, 2004)
(notes on file with McGeorge Law Review).
88. See LEONARD, supra note 1, at 101 (discussing the problems the overuse of prescription drugs in the
jails pose for battered women in preparing an adequate legal defense).
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V. CONCLUSION
"Women have got to get out of abusive relationships. We all need to
understand that any violent relationship is potentially lethal."89 While Chapter
609's provisions increase the likelihood that wrongly incarcerated battered
women will be released from prison, remaining inconsistencies within the law
leave several women who should be eligible to file a writ of habeas corpus with
no legal remedy.90 Additional measures are needed to ensure that the intended
beneficiaries of the law have access to information concerning their right to
habeas relief.9' Furthermore, training is needed to ensure that attorneys and the
courts understand how to use evidence of the effects of battering and when it is
necessary and appropriate. 9
When battered women kill they are acting to help themselves out of a
situation to which they see no other options.93 Therefore, it is important to note
that Chapter 609's amendments are retroactive provisions and efforts to provide
abused women with viable options to successfully leave abusive situations must
continue. 94
89. See id. at 128 (quoting the founder of Convicted Women Against Abuse founder Brenda Clubine);
see also WALKER, supra note 24, at xv (emphasizing that a commonality among battered women is the belief
that their partner is capable of killing them).
90. See supra Part IV.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See JONES, supra note 40, at 101 (indicating that women who kill their abusers act with the intent to
escape rather than to injure them which is demonstrated by a decrease in the number of women who kill since
the opening of domestic violence safe houses).
94. SEE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, available at
http://www.abanet. org/domviolstats.html (last visited July 26, 2004) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(indicating that police and court system responses to domestic violence need improvement, that protective
orders do not eliminate violence, the risk of serious violence to a woman increases dramatically when she
attempts to leave, and that homicide in domestic situations is often the result of an "escalating history of
abuse"); LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 140 (1984) (explaining the need for
improvements in the legal response to violence and recommending community-wide task forces); see also
Gilfus, supra note 3 (explaining that the number of women convicted for homicide of their partners has
decreased possibly as a result of improvements in domestic violence services for women); Vogt, supra note 83,
at 10 (additionally emphasizing that there need to be services to assist women who have successfully overturned
their convictions in transitioning back into society as they often have nowhere to go).
